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Hughes: The Evolution of Youth as an Excuse

THE EVOLUTION OF YOUTH AS AN EXCUSE: STRIKING A
BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTEREST OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT KIDS ARE KIDS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
In re Jaquan M.1
(decided July 3, 2012)
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Jaquan M., a fourteen year old, was tried in a family court juvenile proceeding for the adult crime equivalent of possession of a
weapon in the second degree.2 At approximately 9:30 p.m., police
officers patrolling “in a drug-prone location” observed Jaquan walking down the sidewalk with a backpack.3 He then veered off the
sidewalk between two parked cars, and looked both ways up and
down the road.4 Back on the sidewalk, Jaquan looked up and down
once again, and paced in a circle.5 He then made a thirty-second
cellphone call, and continued pacing and looking around.6 While
kneeling between the parked cars, Jaquan cautiously removed a white
object from his waistband and placed it in the side pocket of his
backpack.7 Despite officers’ admissions that the white object looked
nothing like a gun, the officers believed the object could have been a
firearm because Jaquan handled the object in such a careful manner
and had removed it from “the most common location for carrying a
gun.”8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

948 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2012).
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
Id.
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Following their observations, one police officer approached
Jaquan, noticed his backpack appeared bottom-heavy, identified himself, and told Jaquan to walk with him.9 Jaquan then indicated he
was fourteen years old by stating, “What do you want from me? I am
only fourteen [years old].”10 While the second officer approached,
the first officer frisked Jaquan and asked about his comings and goings.11 Jaquan quickly answered that he was coming from a relative’s
house.12 But, as to where he was going, he pointed out an address
written in pen on his arm, and said, “Here.”13 This address was
known to police as being in “a high crime, drug-prone” area.14
Officers smelled marihuana, and inquired about the contents
of the backpack twice.15 In both instances, Jaquan countered by stating that nothing was in the backpack.16 Upon the officers’ inquiry
regarding Jaquan’s identification, Jaquan provided only a first name
and birthdate, but did not provide any other form of identification.17
Jaquan then gave police permission to check the contents of his
backpack for school papers, as he suggested that he might have some
papers bearing his full name.18 The officers found nothing inside the
main compartment, but upon searching the side pocket, they found a
heavy white bag.19 Considering Jaquan to be a flight risk at that
point, the officers handcuffed him, opened the white bag to find a
loaded handgun and rounds of ammunition, and discovered $963.00
in cash in Jaquan’s pocket.20
Following a fact-finding hearing, the family court judge denied Jaquan’s motion to suppress the gun.21 The judge concluded
that the police were justified in their search of the backpack based on
the totality of their observations including: Jaquan’s furtive behavior
in a high-crime area at night, inability to supply his full name to the
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id.
Id.
Id. at 52-53.
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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officers, and his backpack’s heavy appearance.22 As a result of the
denied suppression motion, Jaquan admitted to committing the act
that would have been a crime of possession of a weapon had he been
sixteen years old.23 Consequently, he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed on fifteen months of enhanced supervision probation.24 The family court judge further directed Jaquan “to obey his
parents, attend school regularly, refrain from the use of drugs or alcohol, complete 60 hours of community service and [refrain from
any] gang affiliation or further difficulties at home or in the community.”25
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, relying on People v. De Bour,26 reversed the
family court’s decision, granted the motion to suppress the weapon,
vacated the disposition, and dismissed the case.27 In De Bour, the
court categorized four common police actions:28 (1) the approach in
order to request information; (2) the common-law right to inquire; (3)
the stop and frisk, or “forcible stop and detention;”29 and (4) the arrest.30 In order to justify an approach, police must have “some objective credible reason” for the approach.31 To take the next step and
inquire, police must establish a “founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”32 A forcible stop and detention is legally justified
when based on a reasonable suspicion that a crime occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.33 Lastly, an arrest must be founded on
“probable cause to believe” that a crime was committed.34 Thus, the
justification for a certain level of intrusion by police is directly correlated to the objective credibility of their belief as determined by their
observations and knowledge during the situation in question.35
22

Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
Id.; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
265.03 (McKinney 2006).
24
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
25
Id. at 53-54.
26
352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
27
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 52, 54.
28
Id. at 54 (citing De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72).
29
Id. (quoting De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572).
30
Id.
31
Id.; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72.
32
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572.
33
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572.
34
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54; De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 572.
35
De Bour, 386 N.E.2d at 572.
23
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The court in Jaquan concluded that the police were only justified in the first two De Bour actions—the approach and inquiry.36
Based on Jaquan’s apparently surreptitious behavior in a known
crime-ridden area at night, the police reasonably formed the requisite
founded suspicion that Jaquan “was engaged in criminal activity.”37
However, as to the search of the backpack beyond the main compartment and Jaquan’s arrest, the police did not possess the requisite
reasonable suspicion, or “quantum knowledge sufficient to induce an
ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe that criminal activity is at hand.”38
Based on its curious reasonable suspicion analysis, as well as
its consent analysis, the majority in Jaquan seems to have first concluded that this particular fourteen year old first-time-offender did
not deserve a record, and then analyzed the facts to specifically suppress the gun. The majority reasoned that each police observation of
Jaquan’s behavior, when analyzed independently from the others,
was susceptible to an innocent alternative validation, and therefore
the police did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion.39 However, in the dissenting opinion, Justice Catterson proposed that the
majority incorrectly analyzed each pertinent police observation separately, knocking each down as insufficient by itself to support a reasonable suspicion.40
Instead of this piecemeal approach, the majority should have
applied a totality of the circumstances analysis and viewed the situation “as a progression of actions, with each circumstance increasing
the level of the police officer’s suspicion.”41 For instance, the majority emphasized the police officers’ concessions that the white “object
bore no obvious hallmarks of a [gun].”42 Relying on People v. Crawford 43 and People v. Fernandez,44 the majority reasoned that a simple
36

Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
Id.; see id. at 54, 55 (denouncing the frisk as unreasonable because the officers admitted
the gun looked nothing like a gun and they did not feel their lives were in danger).
38
Id. (quoting People v. Sobotker, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (N.Y. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 57 (Catterson, J., dissenting).
40
Id.
41
Id. (citing People v. Rodriquez, 895 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2010) (finding reasonable suspicion where defendant behaved stealthily, in a high crime and drug distribution location and his waistband appeared weighed down)).
42
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (majority opinion).
43
931 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011) (finding no reasonable suspicion to
seize defendant when he fled police officers with a bulge in his pocket).
37
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action of holding an object near one’s waistband, or presence of a
bulge in a pocket, without any precise visible factor(s) indicating a
gun—such as an outline in the shape of a gun—is not enough to reasonably conclude the suspect is in possession of a gun.45 Nevertheless, the majority disregarded the valid possibility that other factors
gave the officers reason to suspect that Jaquan carried a gun or other
dangerous weapon.46 In fact, Justice Catterson pointed out that the
bulge was no longer merely a bulge when the police observed Jaquan
pull the white object, which was about the size of a gun, from out of
his waistband, handling the object with care.47 Furthermore, Justice
Catterson explained that there “were other ‘indicia of criminality,’ ”
that the majority failed to recognize as a possible justification for the
police officer’s reasonable suspicion48 such as, the suspicious nature
of the address written on Jaquan’s arm49 Thus, where in reality, the
record reflected that the police made several other legitimate observations that would have led a reasonable person to believe Jaquan was
in possession of a gun,50 the majority seems to have cherry picked
certain facts to satisfy their specific sought after end—a clean slate
for a fourteen year old boy.
Regarding consent to search Jaquan’s backpack, the Appellate
Division concluded that Jaquan did not voluntarily consent to a
search of his entire bag.51 Purportedly, Jaquan possessed a reasonable expectation that the scope of the search would be limited to a
44

928 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011) (concluding no reasonable suspicion
to stop and frisk defendant based only on the fact that his hand was near his waistband and
defendant was observed in a high crime area) (citing People v. Sierra, 638 N.E.2d 955, 956
(N.Y. 1994) (lacking reasonable suspicion to pursue defendant after he grabbed at his waistband and fled)); see also People v. Powell, 667 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t
1998) (reasoning that defendant’s location in a high crime area as the sole indicia of criminality was not sufficient to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and
frisk).
45
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 54, 55 (“Certainly the dissent would argue that any person on
the street, even in a high-crime area, is presumed to be carrying a weapon based only on a
drooping pocket or backpack.”).
46
Id. at 56 (Catterson, J., dissenting).
47
Id. at 57 (citing People v. Alozo, 580 N.Y.S.2d 298, 298-99 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t
1992)).
48
Id.
49
See generally id. at 52-56 (majority opinion).
50
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 57 (Catterson, J., dissenting).
51
Id. at 56 (majority opinion) (citing People v. Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531 (App.
Div. 1st Dep’t 1998) (concluding lack of voluntary consent to a search of the interior of vehicle where it was late at night, inquiries by police were unreasonably accusatory in nature,
and the officer did not inform defendant that he could refuse the search request)).
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mere search for identification papers.52 Thus, “[w]hen the officer
opened a separate compartment in the backpack that contained no papers, the right to proceed [extinguished].”53
However, Justice Catterson rejected this argument—that
Jaquan’s invitation to search was limited to the main compartment of
his backpack—as unpersuasive.54 Instead, the dissent reasoned that
“[t]he scope of a search is ‘generally defined by its expressed object’
and the ‘reasonable’ expectation of the person consenting to the
search.”55 Furthermore, because school papers with an individual’s
name could reasonably be expected to be located in “any pocket of a
student’s backpack,” Justice Catterson argued that Jaquan, by inviting
the police to look inside for identifying papers, actually consented to
the search of his entire backpack.56
Another curious aspect of the court’s decision in Jaquan was
that in determining whether Jaquan voluntarily consented to the
backpack search, the court relied primarily on two cases involving
vehicle searches, as opposed to baggage searches.57 The two cases
relied on were People v. Barreras58 and People v. Gomez.59 In
Barreras, the defendant was stopped for allegedly driving through a
stop sign without stopping.60 After police found a gun and drugs in
his vehicle,61 Barreras was ultimately convicted of criminal possession of a weapon, as well as several charges of possession of a controlled substance in varying degrees.62 After pulling Barreras over,
the officer asked for identification papers.63 While responding to the
officer’s questions, Barreras failed to make eye contact with the of-

52

Id. (citing People v. Gomez, 838 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (N.Y. 2005) (finding lack of consent where the scope of a vehicle search went beyond the reasonable expectation when officers damaged the vehicle by removing attached carpet and used a crow bar to alter sheet metal)).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 58 (Catterson, J., dissenting).
55
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (quoting Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 56 (majority opinion).
58
677 N.Y.S.2d 526 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998).
59
838 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 2005), remitted to 808 N.Y.S.2d 626 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t
2005).
60
Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 527.
63
Id. at 528.
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ficer.64 Additionally, while Barreras retrieved his license and registration and handed it over to the officer, his hands trembled.65 The
officer also noted that the “defendant’s nervousness was unusual”
considering he was able to produce the required paperwork.66 The
officer followed up with more questioning, and asked whether “defendant had ‘a machine gun, or a hand grenade, or a rocket launcher’
in the car.”67 Barreras replied negatively, but the reply was not the
jovial response the officer expected to a relatively outlandish, unfounded question.68 Consequently, although at that point the officer
did not “fear for his life,” the officer’s suspicions that Barreras was in
possession of a weapon were further raised.69 The officer then asked
Barreras whether “he would ‘mind’ if the officer looked through the
car.”70 Barreras, while still avoiding eye contact, replied, “Okay.”71
Then, the officer asked if he could search the entire car, and Barreras
responded, “[Y]eah, it’s all right.”72
Upon a cursory inspection of the car with a flashlight, the officer saw “nothing that could ‘hurt’ him,” but continued his search by
looking in the center console.73 The officer noticed that the lining of
the console was loose and removed it.74 Underneath the lining, a
handgun rested on a large, clear plastic bag filled with smaller baggies of cocaine and marihuana.75
At trial, Barreras moved to suppress the handgun and the
76
drugs. The trial court determined “that the totality of the circumstances indicated that ‘[Barreras’] act of consent [to search his car]
was voluntary,’ ” and consequently denied Barreras’ motion to suppress the gun and packages of cocaine and marihuana.77 However,
the Appellate Division, First Department reversed the trial court’s de-

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id.
Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
Id.
Id. at 529.
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cision and granted the motion to suppress the physical evidence.78
The court in Barreras reasoned that “the request to search cannot be
analyzed in a vacuum and the length and circumstances of the continued detention must be considered.”79 Further, the court explained
that, “[f]or a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, the officer’s
action in stopping the vehicle must be justified at its inception and the
seizure must be reasonably related in scope, including its length, to
the circumstances which justified the detention in the first instance.”80 Upon learning that Barreras’ papers were in order, the officer no longer had justification to detain Barreras.81 Without further
indication of wrongdoing, the officers were obligated to issue a
summons, “and allow [Barreras] to resume his journey.”82 Thus, the
fact that Barreras failed to make eye contact, was extremely nervous,
and responded to the officer with innocuous discrepancies, did not
provide the officer with “a basis for further suspicion.”83
Furthermore, the court in Barreras reasoned that the officer’s
questioning went beyond simple requests for information and rose to
the level of a common-law inquiry—requiring “support[] by a founded suspicion that criminality [was] afoot.”84 Because the officer was
not justified in detaining Barreras, the officer was likewise not justified in seeking consent.85 Nevertheless, the court observed that even
if the officer had justification to request consent to search, Barreras
did not consent voluntarily, and thus, the consent was not valid.86
The court explained that proving voluntariness of consent is a heavy
burden for the People to meet.87 That is, consent is only voluntary if
it is an “unequivocal product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice.”88 Observing the circumstances surrounding the officer’s en78

Id.
Id. at 530.
80
Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 530 (quoting People v. Banks, 650 N.E.2d 833, 835 (N.Y.
1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. (quoting People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
85
Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 530.
86
Id. at 531.
87
Id. at 530.
88
Id. (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976) (“Consent to search
is voluntary when it is a true act of the will, an unequivocal product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice.”).
79
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counter with Barreras, specifically that it was late at night, the police
pointed a flashlight at Barreras, and asked him specific and accusatory questions, the court found that Barreras had not consented voluntarily.89
In Gomez, although the defendant’s consent to search his vehicle was voluntary, the court determined the search exceeded the
scope of the consent given.90 Gomez was pulled over by a police officer because the windows of his car were darkly tinted in violation of
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 375.12-a.(b)(2).91 When
the officer approached Gomez’s car, he first looked through the tinted
passenger window, and then examined the undercarriage of the car,
as was his routine as a narcotics investigator.92 The undercarriage
had a fresh undercoat surrounding the gas tank—“a telltale sign[] of
[a] secret compartment[].”93 Gomez also produced a registration card
that seemed to have been altered.94 The tinted windows, the alleged
secret compartment, and the tampered registration card led the officer
to suspect that Gomez’s car had been used for drug transportation.95
Therefore, the officer asked Gomez whether he had any type of contraband in the car.96 Gomez replied, “No.”97 Then, the officer requested consent to search the vehicle, which Gomez provided.98 Upon obtaining consent, the officer ordered Gomez and his passengers
out of the car.99 Immediately, an officer moved back the seat above
the suspicious part of the undercarriage, viewed what looked like a

89
Id. at 531 (citing Hollman, 590 N.E.2d at 211) (finding that consent was not voluntary
when it “was a product of improper police inquiry”); see also Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580
(“No one circumstance is determinative of the voluntariness of consent. Whether consent
has been voluntarily given or is only a yielding to overbearing official pressure must be determined from the circumstances.”).
90
Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272.
91
Id.; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375.12-a.(b)(2) (McKinney 2012) (“No person shall
operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway, road or street: the sidewings or side
windows of which on either side forward of or adjacent to the operator’s seat are composed
of, covered by or treated with any material which has a light transmittance of less than seventy percent.”).
92
Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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brand new carpet, and removed the carpet.100 Under the carpet was a
cut in the floor that the officer attempted to open further with his
pocket knife.101 The same officer then retrieved a crow bar, pried
open the gas tank, and recovered one and a half pounds of cocaine.102
Gomez was then arrested and issued a summons for the tinted windows and an expired inspection.103 Ultimately, Gomez was charged
with, among other things, criminal possession of a controlled substance.104 Subsequently, Gomez claimed lack of voluntary consent to
the search, and alternatively that the scope of the search exceeded the
scope of consent.105 The trial court denied the motion on both
grounds because Gomez “never expressly limited or revoked his
permission” and “in the absence of consent, probable cause existed to
justify the search.”106
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed
that the consent was voluntary, reasoning that the search “did not exceed the scope of [Gomez’s] consent [when Gomez] ‘fail[ed] to place
any limitations on the search, and [failed] to object to the search as it
was conducted.’ ”107 However, the New York Court of Appeals subsequently reversed, finding that the officer received general consent,
but that the search went beyond the scope of the consent given.108
Relying on a Second Circuit interpretation of consent, the Court of
Appeals reiterated that “an individual who consents to a search of his
car should reasonably expect that readily-opened containers discovered inside the car will be opened and examined.”109 Further, the
court determined that general consent to search an object, by itself is
not sufficient to “justify a search that impairs the structural integrity
of a vehicle,” and therefore, the officer should have obtained specific
consent to justify the forced opening of the floorboards of the car and
100

Id.
Id.
102
Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1272.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1272-73.
106
Id. at 1273.
107
Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273 (quoting People v. Gomez, 782 N.Y.S.2d 744, 744 (App.
Div. 1st Dep’t 2004)).
108
Id. at 1274.
109
Id. at 1273 (quoting United States v. Snow, 44 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1995) (reasoning
that the search did not exceed the scope of consent when the officer opened a duffle bag
found in the back seat of a car and another bag under the back seat) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
101
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damaging the gas tank.110
Here, as mentioned above, Jaquan is distinguishable from
Barreras and Gomez because the object in question in Jaquan was a
student’s backpack, not a vehicle, and the search did not exceed the
scope of Jaquan’s consent.111 First, in Jaquan, the police did not ask
questions, like in Barreras, that rose to the level of being accusatory
in nature.112 Nor did the police in Jaquan shine flashlights in
Jaquan’s face or intentionally intimidate him prior to receiving his
consent to the requested search.113 Additionally, as opposed to
Gomez, where the police damaged the vehicle, in Jaquan the backpack was left intact.114
Ultimately, whether one agrees with the decision in Jaquan or
not, Jaquan was granted a clean slate.115 Perhaps the court was sympathetic towards Jaquan because he was fourteen, just as the United
States Supreme Court was sympathetic to the fourteen year olds in
Miller v. Alabama,116 which was decided less than a month prior to
Jaquan.117 Additionally, although implied here, the disposition in
Jaquan seems to reflect a growing trend throughout the country, as
well as in New York State, recognizing the significant differences between children and adults that affect levels of criminal culpability.118
Nevertheless, in reversing the disposition, the Appellate Division appeared to have engaged in significant legal gymnastics in order to
achieve a certain result.
The overarching issue remains: At what age should a person
be considered an adult in the eyes of the law? This case note will ad110

Id. at 1273-74.
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (Catterson, J., dissenting).
112
Compare Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53 (asking defendant pedigree information) (majority opinion), with Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 528 (asking whether defendant had illegal
contraband in his car).
113
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d 51; Barreras, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
114
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 53; Gomez, 838 N.E.2d at 1273-74.
115
Jaquan, 948 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
116
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (establishing that mandatory sentences of life without parole
constituted cruel and unusual punishment of fourteen year old juveniles).
117
See Prof. Richard Klein, Presenter, 24th Annual Leon D. Lazer Supreme Court Review
at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center Department of Continuing Legal Education (Oct. 26, 2012) (explaining that the Court granted certiorari to defendants in Miller because people tend to be more sympathetic to fourteen year olds as opposed to sixteen or seventeen year olds).
118
See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (determining that in light of
recent proliferation of psychological studies of adolescents, it is no longer constitutional for
states to subject juveniles to mandatory life sentences without parole).
111
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dress some procedural differences between juvenile proceedings and
adult criminal proceedings, analyze the evolution of federal precedent
regarding juvenile culpability, and discuss the proposed litigation in
New York State that, if passed will increase the age of culpability in
the State.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
JUVENILES UNDER FEDERAL LAW

A basic understanding of juvenile treatment under federal law
may help to explain the underpinnings of the decision in Jaquan. As
policy-makers and the judiciary have historically observed, children
should not be held to the same standard of culpability as adults.119
Yet, medicine, science, and legal theories continue to evolve in order
to reflect societal norms and other relevant policy concerns. Thus,
finding an appropriate balance between these competing interests—
seeking to safeguard juveniles’ constitutional protections while holding them to a lesser standard of culpability has proven a difficult task
for the legislature, as well as the courts.
A.

The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act

Following the proliferation of separate juvenile justice systems on the state level, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(“FJDA”) was enacted in 1938.120 The FJDA was designed to protect
youths from the “consequences of a criminal conviction.”121 It also
recognized the possible benefits of rehabilitation and treatment as an
alternative to punishment.122 One provision in the Act permitted federal prosecutors to offer any defendant under the age of eighteen to
be prosecuted as a juvenile in a federal district court, contingent upon
the juvenile’s acceptance of the special prosecution in writing.123
However, following several Supreme Court decisions regarding juveniles, discussed in the following sections, the FJDA was amended by
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
119

Tina Chen, Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: Why is it a Fundamental
Right for Adults and Not for Juveniles?, 28 J. JUV. L. 1, 1 (2007).
120
Id.
121
United States v. Torres, 500 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1974).
122
Id.
123
D. Ross Martin, Note, Conspiratorial Children? The Intersection of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and Federal Conspiracy Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (1994).
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(“JJDPA”).124 The JJDPA provided funding to state juvenile justice
programs to reduce and prevent juvenile delinquency.125 It also “restructured the federal juvenile court system . . . by incorporating provisions borrowed from model acts and state statutory reform,” and altered the FJDA in four major ways.126 First, the definition of a
juvenile under federal law changed from any person under the age of
eighteen at the time of indictment, to any person below the age of
twenty-one who has committed an offense before reaching the age of
eighteen.127 Second, the JJPDA “required judicial approval before
trying any juvenile as an adult.”128 Third, the offenses for which a
juvenile could be prosecuted as an adult were limited.129 Fourth, the
JJPDA permitted federal prosecution of juveniles only in instances
where a state refused to prosecute the offense.130 In 1984, the FJDA
was again substantially modified by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.131 In what was thought of as an adequate response to violent
juvenile conduct, the amendment added provisions that required the
transfer of juveniles over sixteen, who were charged with certain violent felonies or serious narcotics offenses, to criminal prosecution in
federal district court. 132
Even before all its modifications, the FJDA was revolutionary
in establishing a process through which juvenile crimes could be adjudicated that differed from that of adult criminal proceedings. 133 As
opposed to New York State law, which currently has the general age
of culpability and subsequent prosecution in adult criminal court set
at sixteen,134 the FJDA originally set the age of culpability at eight-

124
Id. at 861 n.15 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)); see Williams S. Sessions & Fay M.
Bracey, A Synopsis of the Federal Juvevnile Delinquency Act, 14 ST. MARY’S L.J. 509, 509
(1983) (providing a general historical summary of the FJDA prior to the 1984 amendments).
125
Justice Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice in Texas—It’s a Crime! Or Should Be,
51 BAYLOR L. REV. 17, 26-27 (1999).
126
Martin, supra note 123, at 861.
127
Id. at 862.
128
Id.at 861.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Martin, supra note 123, at 862.
132
Id. at 861-62, 865-66 (citations omitted).
133
Torres, 500 F.2d at 949.
134
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20.42 (McKinney 2011); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1)
(McKinney 2010).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 5

980

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

een.135 Furthermore, since the passage of the FJDA, age eighteen has
remained the general age of culpability for violations of federal
law.136
B.

Due Process Rights of Juveniles

Despite its many amendments and attempts to uniformly provide fairness in juvenile proceedings, the FJDA did not encode all
due process rights normally afforded adults to juveniles involved in
federal adjudication procedures.137 For example, as discussed later in
this section, the Sixth Amendment usually affords adult defendants
found in violation of federal law the right to a trial by jury; however,
juveniles who are adjudicated in federal district court do not share the
same guarantees afforded under this right.138
There are two key justifications for the variation of rights afforded to adults and juveniles. The first is that juveniles, whether
charged and tried in federal or state court, are “proceeded against by
information.”139 The second rationale is that even where the conduct
underlying a charge is criminal in nature, the procedure and resolution of juvenile delinquency proceedings are considered a hybrid of
civil and criminal proceedings.140
Twenty years after the FJDA, but prior to any of its major
amendments, in the Application of Gault,141 the United States Supreme Court recognized that notwithstanding the differences between
adult and juvenile adjudication, “[t]he Court has consistently made
plain that adequate and timely notice is the fulcrum of due process,
whatever the purposes of the proceeding.”142 The Court explained
that while the states have the inherent authority and discretion to implement policy that differs from that which is afforded at the federal
level, one’s right to receive notice of the charges raised against him
or her is “[s]o fundamental a protection [that it cannot] be spared
here nor left to the ‘favor or grace’ of state authorities.”143 The Court
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Kinkeade, supra note 125, at 26; Sessions & Bracey, supra note 124, at 516.
See 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2006).
McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971); Chen, supra note 119, at 1-2.
McKiever, 403 U.S. at 547; Chen, supra note 119, at 1-2.
Torres, 500 F.2d at 945.
McKiever, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (citations omitted).
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 73.
Id. (quoting Central of Georgia R.R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127, 138 (1907)).
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explained that in specific situations where a child’s liberty is at stake,
meaning there is a possibility that he or she “may be committed to a
state institution . . . the Due Process Clause has a role to play.”144
In Gault, fifteen-year old Gerald Gault, who was presently on
a term of probation, was committed to a juvenile detention center in
Arizona for six years after he made a lewd phone call to a woman.145
An adult, age eighteen years or older, committing the same crime
would have received a maximum punishment of “a fine of $5 or $50,
or imprisonment” of up to two months.146 At the time Gerald was
picked up by an officer for the phone call, his parents were both at
work.147 The police officers failed to inform Mr. and Mrs. Gault that
their son had been arrested and “taken to [a] Children’s Detention
Home.”148 Consequently, when Mrs. Gault arrived home from work,
she sent her other son to look for Gerald.149 The brother somehow
learned where Gerald had been taken and arrested, and told his mother.150 Only upon speaking with the arresting officer by going to the
“detention home” did Mrs. Gault find out “why Jerry was there.”151
The officer also informed Mrs. Gault at the Detention Home that
Gerald’s first hearing would be the next day.152
In accordance with the Arizona Juvenile Code at the time, the
arresting officer filed a general petition that failed to provide specific
facts, but alleged that Gerald was a neglected and delinquent child.153
Also in accordance with the then-existing Arizona Code, the petition
was filed in the court, but never served upon Gerald or his parents.154
At the initial hearing on June 9, 1964, the Gaults made their appearances.155 However, the woman who allegedly received the lewd
phone calls (the complainant) did not attend that hearing or any subsequent hearings and never spoke with the judge.156 Furthermore, the
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 13.
Id. at 4.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 29.
Id at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 5, 7.
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hearing was neither recorded and transcribed, nor documented in a
“memorandum or record [reflecting] the substance of the proceedings.”157 The judge questioned Gerald about the phone calls and Gerald apparently “admitted [to] making one of the lewd statements.”158
At the end of the hearing, despite the judge’s adjournment of the proceedings by saying, “he would ‘think about it,’ ” Gerald was returned
to the Detention Home instead of to his parents.159 After being detained for approximately three or four days, Gerald was finally sent
home with a handwritten note from the arresting officer informing
Mrs. Gault of the date and time of a second delinquency hearing.160
At this second hearing, the judge adjudicated Gerald a juvenile delinquent and committed him to the State Industrial School until he
turned twenty-one.161
At the time, Arizona law prevented Gerald from appealing the
juvenile court disposition to a higher court.162 Therefore, the Gaults
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of
Arizona, which was referred to the Superior Court.163 The Superior
Court dismissed the writ.164 On review, the Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed dismissal of the writ.165
The Gaults appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the Juvenile Code of Arizona violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it lacked procedural
safeguards and gave “the Juvenile Court virtually unlimited discretion.”166 The Gaults further argued that the Arizona Code denied juveniles six basic rights: “1. Notice of charges; 2. Rights to counsel; 3.
Right to confrontation and cross-examination; 4. Privilege against
self-incrimination; 5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings; and 6.
Right to appellate review.”167
In Gault, the United States Supreme Court relied on three of
its previous decisions that touched upon constitutional questions of
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.at 10.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.
Id.
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due process as applied to various specific stages of state juvenile proceedings.168 The three cases included Haley v. Ohio,169 Gallegos v.
Colorado,170 and Kent v. United States.171 Haley and Gallegos both
involved the admissibility of confessions by juveniles and determined
that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the due process protection against the admissibility of coerced confessions by juveniles.172
In Kent, a juvenile challenged the constitutionality of a court’s
failure to provide a hearing to decide whether he should be tried in
adult criminal court.173 The Court in Kent “emphasized the necessity
that ‘the basic requirements of due process and fairness’ [b]e satisfied
in [hearings determining whether to waive a juvenile to adult criminal
court].”174 Additionally, the Court in Kent outlined that the
objectives [of the juvenile court system] are to provide
measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child
and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens
patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.
But the admonition to function in a “parental” relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.175
Relying on the above general principles, observing that all
persons, including those under eighteen should enjoy protections
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, the Court in Gault determined
that juveniles have a right to notice of charges,176 to counsel,177 to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against self-incrimination.178 In fact, the Court, in its analysis of
the Arizona Code, lauded the New York Family Court Act as an example of a statute that successfully included procedural due process
guarantees to juveniles, such as the right to counsel and protection
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id. at 12-13.
332 U.S. 596 (1948).
370 U.S. 49 (1962).
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Gault, 387 U.S. at 12-13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 553).
Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-55.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 33-34.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 57.
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against self-incrimination.179 However, the Court also called into
question the merits of a separate juvenile justice system—citing statistical studies representing a failure to deter recidivism and rehabilitate juveniles.180 In turn, the Court explained that should juveniles
remain adjudicated separately from adults, a juvenile court’s well intentioned model of parens patriae must not overshadow constitutional guarantees, opining that:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated,
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure . . . The absence of substantive standards has not
necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of
procedural rules based upon constitutional principle
has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective
procedures. Departures from established principles of
due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness . . . Due process of
law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom . . . [T]he observance of due process
standards, intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile
process.181
Keeping in mind this underlying concept, the Court in Gault established that in order to comply with the Constitution, state law must
acknowledge that children, much like adults, have a right to timely
notice of charges,182 a right to counsel,183 a right to confrontation and
cross-examination,184 and a right to invoke the privilege against self-

179
Id. at 40-41, 48 (“In New York . . . the recently enacted Family Court Act provides that
the juvenile and his parents must be advised at the start of the hearing of his right to remain
silent . . . police must [also] attempt to communicate with . . . parents before questioning [a
juvenile], and that absent ‘special circumstances’ a confession may not be obtained from a
child prior to notifying his parents or relatives and releasing the child either to them or to the
Family Court.”).
180
Id. at 21-22.
181
Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-21.
182
Id. at 33-34.
183
Id. at 41.
184
Id. at 57.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/5

18

Hughes: The Evolution of Youth as an Excuse

2013]

THE EVOLUTION OF YOUTH AS AN EXCUSE

985

incrimination.185 Furthermore, although the Court did not touch upon
other rights such as appellate review, it reversed the Supreme Court
of Arizona and remanded Gerald Gault’s case for further proceedings
in juvenile court consistent with Gault.186 Thus, the Court in Gault
recognized that safeguarding children’s due process rights would actually aid children, rejecting the notion that affording those rights
could negatively affect the questionable benefits provided by the juvenile court parens patriae approach.187
C.

Right to Trial by Jury

In the wake of Gault, courts became more accepting of the
benefits of affording limited due process rights to children, while also
becoming more cognizant of the potential for success in state juvenile
justice systems.188 Furthermore, following Gault, the Supreme Court
affirmed other fundamental rights of juveniles, such as the right to the
standard of proof of delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt.189
However, in McKiever v. Pennsylvania,190 the Court determined that
the fundamental right to trial by jury in state court afforded to adults
was not necessarily fundamental to children in state juvenile courts
because entitling children to a jury trial could infringe upon the
unique, rehabilitative goals of those courts.191 Refraining from conclusively labeling juvenile court proceedings as either “criminal” or
“civil,” the Court reasoned that requiring a jury trial “as a matter of
constitutional precept . . . [would] remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and . . . put an effective end to . . . the
idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.”192
Relying on statistical studies, the Court assessed the “juvenile con185
Id. at 55; see Gault, 387 U.S. at 47 (observing that the Fifth Amendment, by its express
language is an “unequivocal protection [] without exception”, the Court commented that “[i]t
would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children”).
186
Id. at 59.
187
Id. at 21.
188
See, e.g., Mckiever, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366; United States
v. Torres, 500 F.2d 944 (1974).
189
Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
190
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
191
Mckiever, 403 U.S. at 540 (indicating that the “addition of the trial by jury ‘might well
destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings.’ ” (quoting In re Terry, 265 A.2d
350, 355 (Pa. 1970))).
192
Id. at 541, 545.
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cept” as a “disappointment[] of grave dimensions” because it failed
to deliver on its promised rehabilitative goals.193 Additionally, the
Court recognized that a separate juvenile system fails because its success “depends on the availability of resources, on the interest and
commitment of the public, on willingness to learn, and on understanding as to cause and effect and cure.”194 Nevertheless, the Court
reasoned that in the unique field of creating a special court to rehabilitate children and prevent recidivism, experimentation is the key to
success, and “imposing the jury trial” would impede upon that experimentation.195 In declining to declare a fundamental right to a jury
trial for juveniles, the Court left room for the States to decide whether
to embrace such a right.196 Ultimately, however, the Court cautioned
against applying all criminal procedures to juvenile court proceedings, explaining that “[i]f the formalities of the criminal adjudicative
process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there
is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined
to give impetus to it.”197
In United States v. Torres,198 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the precedent established in
Mckiever, concluding that juveniles were not entitled to a jury trial
even where prosecuted under the FJDA.199 Torres, a sixteen year old,
was charged with creating an unauthorized photographic negative of
a One Dollar Bill.200 On appeal, Torres argued that sections 5031
through 5037 of the FJDA violated the right to trial by jury under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.201 Torres argued
that the Act was unconstitutional because it forced a juvenile to make
the choice between being tried as a juvenile and waiving the right to a
jury trial, or being tried as an adult with the right to a jury trial.202
Nevertheless, relying on McKeiver, the Court of Appeals upheld the
FJDA as constitutional, observing in part that a juvenile proceeding
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id. at 547.
Id.
Id.
McKiever, 403 U.S. at 547.
Id. at 551.
500 F.2d 944 (1974).
Torres, 500 F.2d at 949.
Id. at 945.
Id.
Id. at 946.
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does not fall within the scope of the criminal prosecution proceedings
that are protected by the Sixth Amendment.203 In its reasoning, the
court reiterated the principals of Mckiever, recognizing the need for
the progress of juvenile courts as well as the FJDA’s commendable
objectives to rehabilitate and “protect the wayward youth from stigma and other consequences of a criminal conviction.”204 In fact, articulating that affording the right to trial by jury to children could
possibly deter from the Act’s commendable objectives, the Second
Circuit explained:
[T]he Juvenile court system providing intimate, informal, protective and paternalistic procedure for the
juvenile accused of wrongdoing, with rehabilitation
rather than punishment as its goal, still ha[s] promise.
To impose on that system trial by jury as a matter of
right would be a regressive and undesirable step. It
would undermine the Juvenile Court’s ability to carry
out its praiseworthy functions and goals and “would
tend once again to place the juvenile squarely in the
routine of the criminal process.”205
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals extended McKiever, upheld the
FJDA, and concluded that the Sixth Amendment did not, for the purposes of jury trial, extend to juvenile proceedings in federal court.206
D.

Juvenile Culpability and Punishment

In Thompson v. Oklahoma,207 a fifteen year old convicted of
first-degree murder was sentenced to death.208 Determining that it
was cruel and unusual to sentence anyone under the age of sixteen to
death, the United States Supreme Court reversed the sentence because it violated the Eighth Amendment.209 The Court considered the
fact that all states allowed for juvenile court jurisdiction over juveniles up to sixteen years of age, and cited several consistent legal lim-

203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Id. at 949.
Torres, 500 F.2d at 948.
Id. at 947 (quoting McKiever, 403 U.S. at 547).
Id. at 948.
487 U.S. 815 (1988).
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818, 819.
Id. at 838.
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its that divided children and adults.210 Further, the Court acknowledged “that the normal fifteen year old is just not prepared to assume
the full responsibilities of an adult.”211 In reaching its decision, the
Court also recognized that under the Constitution “punishment should
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.”212 The Court described youth as “a time and condition of life”
resulting in minors possessing a lessened capacity for perspective and
good judgment.213 Thus, despite youths’ ability to cause irreparable
harm, the Court acknowledged that younger people, “have less capacity to control their conduct” and conceive of long-term consequences.214
Most adults, having been teenagers before, understand the
seemingly obvious, yet, important character differences between
children and adults that the Court in Thompson emphasized and used
to justify juveniles’ limited capacity for criminal responsibility.
However, in what almost seems like an excuse for inexcusable individual behavior, the Court unloaded the culpability of youths onto
society as a whole.215 The Court reasoned that criminal acts by juveniles “represent a failure of family, school, and the social system,
which share responsibility for the development of America’s
youth.”216
Approximately fifteen years following Thompson, a divided
Court raised similar Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment issues regarding the death penalty and juveniles in Roper v. Simmons.217 Upon careful consideration for the concerns in this context, the Court
raised the constitutional age limit of capital punishment from sixteen
to eighteen years old.218 This time, the Court likened the condition of
adolescence to that of mental retardation because of their shared abil210

Id. at 824-25 (pointing to legal lines drawn between children and adults because a certain level of responsibility is needed to participate in regulated activities, such as voting,
gambling, serving on a jury, marrying without parental consent, and purchasing alcohol and
tobacco products).
211
Id. at 825.
212
Id. at 834 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
213
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
214
Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n.11) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
218
Id. at 575.
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ity to lessen legal standards of criminal culpability.219 Notably, the
Court recognized the arbitrariness of setting the age at eighteen and
further explained why juveniles should not be considered as culpable
as adults.220 First, juveniles lack maturity which can lead to reckless
behavior and ill-considered actions.221 Second, “juveniles are more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures
including peer pressure,”222 and therefore, have less ability to “extricate themselves from . . . criminogenic setting[s].”223 Third, as opposed to adults, juveniles have yet to fully develop a fixed character.224 Consequently, there is a general belief that juveniles may still
be reformed, despite committing a heinous crime.225
More recently, in Graham v. Florida,226 the Court expanded
the application of the Roper and Thompson concepts of juveniles’ rehabilitative nature.227 In Graham, the Court concluded that the
Eighth Amendment protects juveniles, convicted of all crimes except
murder, from being sentenced to life without parole (“LWOP”).228
Given the age of a juvenile, life spent in prison is much longer on average compared to that of an adult, and therefore, cruel and unusual.229 In its decision, the Court outlined why sentencing a juvenile to
LWOP, other than with a conviction of homicide, lacks sufficient
penological justification.230 First, retribution does not justify LWOP
because juveniles are no longer considered as culpable as adults and
LWOP is the highest punishment a juvenile can constitutionally receive.231 Second, LWOP is not justified as a deterrent for juvenile
219

Id. at 563 (“Mental retardation . . . diminishes personal culpability even if the offender
can distinguish right from wrong.” (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002))).
220
Id. at 574 (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes
between childhood and adulthood. It is . . . the age at which the line for death eligibility
ought to rest.”).
221
Id. at 569.
222
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115).
223
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
224
Id. 543 U.S. at 570.
225
Id. (observing “[t]he reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it
is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character”).
226
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
227
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029-30, 2038.
228
Id. at 2034.
229
Id. at 2028.
230
Id.
231
Id. (stating that “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must
be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender” (quoting Tison v. Ari-
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crime because “[juveniles] are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions,” especially when the
punishment is rare.232 Third, although recognized as a prevention of
recidivism, as well as a promotion of public safety, incapacitation of
juveniles for life categorically denies their previously recognized
malleable, rehabilitative nature.233 Lastly, LWOP does not justify the
goal of rehabilitation through imprisonment because
[t]he penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative
ideal. By denying the defendant the right to reenter
the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society.
This judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile
nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability.234
Most recently, the Court in Miller v. Alabama235 again recognized the condition of youth as a limitation on culpability. 236 In Miller, two fourteen year old defendants from different states were
granted certiorari and challenged their respective state’s mandatory
LWOP sentences.237 Both teenagers were tried as adults and convicted of murder.238 Reiterating the justifications set forth by the Court
in both Roper and Graham, the Court confirmed “what ‘any parent
knows’ ” and what social and scientific studies have demonstrated—
that juveniles are less blameworthy because they are reckless and impulsive, have an increased vulnerability to their environment, and are
inherently less fixed in character than the average adult.239 Thus, the
Court in Miller concluded that imposing a mandatory sentence of
LWOP on juveniles as a less culpable class is violative of the Eighth
zona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
232
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29.
233
See id. at 2029; see also Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky.
1968) (declaring a belief “that incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth [and] it is impossible
to make a judgment that a fourteen year old youth, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his life”).
234
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029-30 (reasoning that LWOP defendants are not provided
with vocational or other services that are rehabilitative in nature, to which juveniles are the
most receptive).
235
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
236
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-64.
237
Id. at 2460.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 2464 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
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Amendment because no matter the crime, the severity of the penalty
will always be disproportionate.240
Although Miller and Jackson were both fourteen years old
and had similar convictions, sentences, and upbringings,241 each teenager’s level of involvement in his respective crime was diametric.242
Jackson, from Arkansas, was charged in 1999 with capital felony
murder and aggravated robbery, and sentenced to LWOP. 243 The
Court noted that it was questionable whether Jackson played an active role in the robbery, or simply became caught up in circumstances
beyond his control.244 While Jackson walked to the video store with
two other boys, he learned that one boy had a shot-gun under his
coat.245 Upon arrival at the store, Jackson waited outside while the
other boys entered.246 Jackson then entered the store and witnessed
the boy with the shotgun demanding money from the clerk.247 The
parties at trial disputed whether Jackson “told his friends, ‘I thought
you all was playing’ ” or warned the clerk by stating, “[W]e ain’t
playin.” 248
Unfortunately for Jackson, under Arkansas law prosecutors
are given discretion to charge juveniles as adults for certain violent
crimes, and this particular prosecutor exercised that discretion.249 Before his conviction, Jackson made a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court.250 However, the Court denied Jackson’s motion in light
of Jackson’s arrest history for shoplifting and car theft, the results of
a psychiatric examination, and the “alleged facts of [Jackson’s]
crime.”251
Miller, from Alabama, grew up with a drug-addict mother,
and attempted suicide at age six.252 One evening in 2003, Miller
smoked marihuana and played drinking games with his friend, Smith,
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

Id. at 2469.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.
Id. at 2468-69.
Id. at 2461.
Id.
Id.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
Id. at 2462.
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and Miller’s mother’s drug dealer, Cannon.253 Later, when Cannon
passed out, Miller stole his wallet.254 Upon catching Miller, Cannon
grabbed Miller.255 Then, Miller seized a baseball bat and beat Cannon continuously.256 Before Miller delivered the last blow to incapacitate Cannon, he put a sheet over Cannon’s face and said, “I am
God, I’ve come to take your life.”257 Then, along with Smith, Miller
attempted to cover up the evidence by starting a fire.258 Cannon ultimately died from the injuries caused by the bat and smoke inhalation.259
Alabama juvenile law differs slightly from Arkansas law.260
Arkansas law gave deference to the prosecution to charge Jackson as
an adult subject to the juvenile’s petition for a transfer to juvenile
court,261 whereas Alabama law required that Miller automatically be
adjudicated as a juvenile.262 Furthermore, in Alabama, when certain
crimes are alleged to have occurred, the District Attorney may seek a
removal from juvenile court to criminal court.263 In light of Miller’s
apparent “mental maturity” and prior juvenile offenses of truancy and
criminal mischief, as well as the violent “nature of the [alleged]
crime,” the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the removal.264
In overturning both Miller and Jackson’s sentences, and concluding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme
that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders,” the Court expanded the precedent set by Roper and Graham, heavily relying on scientific studies.265 The Court did make
clear, however, that in Miller it was “not categorically barr[ing] a
253

Id.
Id.
255
Id.
256
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
262
Id. at 2462.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 2463.
265
Id. at 2469; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65 (stating that previous scientific “findings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both
lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and
neurological development occurs, his deficiencies will be reformed”).
254
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penalty for a class of offender’s . . . [i]nstead, [the Court’s ruling]
mandate[d] only that a sentence follow a certain process—
considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before
imposing a particular penalty.”266
III.

JUVENILE TREATMENT IN NEW YORK STATE

Federal precedent regarding juveniles reveals how science
and statistics have influenced the United States Supreme Court decisional law, especially when the science confirms our own common
intuition.267 Over the past fifty years courts have gone from one extreme to another in the treatment of juveniles. Before Gault, a young
child could be detained without due process because he made a lewd
phone call.268 On the other side of the spectrum, presently, children
are definitively recognized as less culpable and the law has come to
their aid by giving them, in some ways, more rights than adults.269
Over the years, similar policy concerns that have influenced the federal courts have also influenced New York State in its process and
procedure used to adjudicate juveniles. Specifically, in light of Miller, the New York State Legislature has sought to raise the age of
culpability by either providing the family court with automatic jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency proceedings for sixteen and seventeen year old, non-violent offenders, or by creating special “youth divisions” for their prosecution.270
A.

Evolution of Family Courts and Current
Designations Under the Family Court Act

In conjunction with the Penal Law, Article 3 of the Family
Court Act regulates juvenile delinquency proceedings and dispositions.271 The New York State Family Court Act (“Family Court

266

Id. at 2471.
See generally Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (relying on statistics of recidivism to question the merits of a separate juvenile court system); Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (citing several scientific psychological and brain science studies relied on in Roper and Graham).
268
See generally Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
269
See generally Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
270
See S.B. 7394, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012) available at
http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S7394-2011; S.B. 7020, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess.
(N.Y. 2012) available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S7020-2011.
271
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, Art. 3 (McKinney 2012).
267
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Act”) was enacted in 1962.272 Almost a century and a half prior to its
enactment, various programs in New York State were developed to
handle youths in a more rehabilitative fashion, and therefore, differently than their adult counterparts.273 One of the first efforts to separate juvenile offenders from adult criminals included the creation of
the New York House of Refuge, which was authorized to receive juveniles upon their judicial commitment.274 Several decades later, the
New York State Legislature enacted the “Disorderly Child” Act.275
That Act defined disorderly children as people “under the age of sixteen . . . deserting their homes without good and sufficient cause, or
keeping company with dissolute or vicious persons against the lawful
command of their [parent] . . . or other persons standing in the place
of a parent.”276 As the nineteenth century came to a close, state child
welfare agencies surged in urban New York areas, identifying a
greater need for specialized courts to handle familial issues, including
child prosecutions.277 Thus, branches of criminal courts, called Children’s Courts Parts, began to spring up in in Manhattan and the
Bronx.278 By the 1920s, the Children’s Court Act authorized the creation of similar courts in other counties across New York State to
specifically handle cases dealing with juvenile delinquency and child
neglect.279 Eventually, in 1962, the Family Court Act created a uniform court system, granting jurisdiction to family courts to handle
cases involving “every symptom of familial dysfunction,” including,
but not limited to child neglect, juvenile delinquency, intra-family violence, and paternity suits.280 The Act “establish[ed] procedures in
accordance with due process of law,” seeking to balance “the needs
and best interests of [juveniles with] the need for protection of the

272

Merril Sobie, No Longer A ‘Judicial Stepchild’, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202574588751&slreturn=20130
308234848.
273
Rose M. Charles & Jennifer V. Zuccarelli, Note, Serving No “Purpose”: The DoubleEdged Sword of New York’s Juvenile Offender Law, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL
COMMENTARY 721, 726-27 (1997) (providing an in depth history of juvenile treatment in the
court system in New York).
274
Merril Sobie, Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 111 (McKinney 2012).
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Sobie, supra note 274.
280
Id.
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community.”281
Under the Family Court Act, if it is proven that a person under sixteen committed an act, which if committed by an adult would
be considered a non-violent crime, he or she is automatically adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent and afforded certain protections within
the Family Court system.282 These protections include a lack of mandatory sentences, an option of complete disposition of a case upon
probation, or a sealed record.283
Currently in New York State, a juvenile is defined as a person
between the ages of seven and under the age of sixteen and over
whom the family court has jurisdiction.284 Unlike in the criminal justice system in which adults are tried, the family courts hold factfinding hearings instead of trials and dispositional hearings instead of
sentencing hearings.285 Furthermore, instead of a determination of
guilt or innocence, a juvenile is adjudged a juvenile delinquent and
put under supervision, treatment, or confinement by the court.286
Youths in New York, ages sixteen and up to nineteen years
old, are considered as criminally culpable as adults as demonstrated
by their automatic arraignment and adjudication in criminal court.287
However, depending on consideration of certain pertinent factors
such as a lack of prior convictions or arrests, a positive reputation in
the community, and a demonstrated respect for the law and society,288
upon petition, those young defendants may be adjudged a youthful
offender.289 Consequently, a youthful offender receives a more lenient sentence, and the possibility of a sealed record, regardless of the
crime.290
281

N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (McKinney 2012).
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 375.1 (McKinney 2010).
283
Id. (stating that if the juvenile proceeding is terminated in favor of the juvenile, all records relating to the prosecution, arrest, and probation will be sealed).
284
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 (McKinney 2010).
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10 (McKinney 2012).
288
People v. Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 333-34 (3d Dep’t 1985) (stating that “factors to be considered include the gravity of the crime, mitigating circumstances, prior criminal record, prior acts of violence . . . level of cooperation with authorities, defendant’s attitude toward society and respect for the law, and the prospects for rehabilitation and hope for
a future constructive life”).
289
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.20 (McKinney 2012).
290
William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.02 (McKinney
2012).
282
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Juvenile Offender Status

Originally, the Family Court Act authorized jurisdiction over
all children, fifteen years of age and younger, who had been charged
with an adult equivalent crime.291 However, in 1978, the passage of
the Juvenile Offender Act (“JOA”) removed family court jurisdiction
over thirteen through fifteen year olds, charged with certain violent
crimes, labeled them “juvenile offenders,” and subjected them to
prosecution and sentencing under the Penal Law as adults.292
The JOA was a knee-jerk legislative response to an infamous
case involving a fifteen year old defendant, Willie Bosket. 293 Bosket
was adjudicated in family court, because of his youthful status, and
was sentenced to only five years in prison for committing a doublehomicide.294 Inferring that some children were beyond repair, and
thus, deserving of adult-like punishment for adult crimes, the JOA
carved out certain exceptions to the prosecution of juveniles under
the age of sixteen.295 These enumerated exceptions, or designated
felony acts, are the most violent, malicious acts, such as, murder,
rape, sexual abuse, arson, kidnapping, and robbery in the first degree.296 As a result, in “a reversal of 150 years of American legal history,” the JOA allowed for child violent offenders, otherwise categorized as juveniles, to suffer the consequences of criminal
prosecution.297
A little over a decade after the JOA became law, the Court of
Appeals of New York decided People v. Roe.298 The facts before the
Court and resolution of the case in Roe illustrate the unintended consequences resulting from a law enacted in the wake of fear and con-

291

Sobie, supra note 274.
Id.
293
See People v. Roe, 542 N.E.2d 610, 620 (N.Y. 1989); see also, Travis Johnson, All
Children Are Created Equal Too: The Disparate Treatment of Youth Rights in America, 15
CUNY L. REV. 173, 182 (2011) (providing some insight into Willie Bosket’s upbringing and
treatment within the courts); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 668 (2002) (explaining the political climate encompassing Willie
Bosket’s case including the fact that Governor Hugh Carey signed the JOA into law two
days following Bosket’s sentencing).
294
Tanenhause & Drizin, supra note 293, at 668.
295
Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 620.
296
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 (McKinney 2010).
297
Johnson, supra note 293.
298
542 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 1989).
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troversy.299 Just six months short of his sixteenth birthday, Steven
Roe was convicted of second degree murder, specifically depraved
indifference murder under Penal Law Section 125.25 (2).300 One idle
summer afternoon, Roe and two of his friends decided to play a game
of “Polish Roulette” with a 12-gauge shotgun.301 Roe incorrectly believed the first two chambers in his gun held “dummy” ammunition,
where in fact they held live ammunition.302 Consequently, Roe accidently shot and killed his best friend’s thirteen year old brother.303
Thus, a senseless game amongst adolescent young boys quickly morphed into an irreversible murder.304
On appeal, the only issue in Roe was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Roe’s guilt for depraved indifference murder.305 Upholding Roe’s conviction, the court explained the mens rea
analysis of depraved indifference, as being “an objective assessment
of the degree of risk presented by defendant’s reckless conduct.”306
Instead of assessing the facts as revealing an impressionable, young
defendant, unfamiliar with guns, the court characterized Roe as a calculated criminal who should have known better than to participate in
“a macabre game of chance where the victim’s fate—life or death—
may be decreed by the flip of a coin or a roll of a die.”307 More notably, the court reasoned that the conviction fit the crime, despite the
boys young age, and immediate remorse, opining that “[t]he sheer
enormity of the act—putting another’s life at such grave peril in this
fashion—is not diminished because the sponsor of the game is a
youth of 15.”308
In an ardent dissent, Judge Bellacosa criticized the JOA and
its effect as categorizing an obviously remorseful, yet reckless juvenile with cold-blooded, intentional, premeditated killers.309 Judge
Bellacosa explained:
299

Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 620 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Id. at 610 (majority opinion).
301
Id. at 616-17 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
302
Id. at 610 (majority opinion).
303
Id. at 616 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
304
Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 616.
305
Id. at 610-11 (majority opinion).
306
Id. at 611 (quoting People v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (N.Y. 1983), overruled by
People v. Feingold, 852 N.E.2d 1163 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
307
Id. at 614.
308
Id.
309
Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 615 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
300
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From common-law times to modern penal code days,
the tragic incident at the heart of this case has qualified as the paradigmatic manslaughter with recklessness as the culpable mental state or mens rea. Indeed,
until recently, persons under 16 years of age in this
State were legal infants incapable of being convicted
of any crime as an adult, no less of the prime, most
heinous crime punishable under our law—murder.
This case represents an enormous penological regression by combining the juvenile offender exception
with the depraved indifference homicide exception and
giving birth to this routinized homogenous murder
category.310
In addition to criticizing the JOA as regressive, Judge Bellacosa critiqued the statutory scheme as improperly subjecting juveniles like
Roe to “a kind of double bind—creating an opposite anomaly from
that which precipitated the juvenile offender legislation—the escape
of then-juvenile delinquent Willie Bosket from the clutches of the
adult criminal law.”311 Additionally, in effect, Judge Bellacosa echoed federal precedent, such as Thompson (decided only a few months
prior) by positing that charging, trying, convicting, and punishing a
fifteen year old so that he may “live the rest of his life with the scarlet
condemnation of ‘depraved murderer’ ”312 distorted the principle of
proportionality.313 Further, Judge Bellacosa concluded his dissent
with a harsh reminder of the consequences of adjudicating juveniles
as adults under the rigidity provided by statutes, explaining that “[i]n
the eyes of the law all the slayers are now made alike, when the perpetrators themselves know and our best instincts and intelligence tell
us, too, that they are very different. Justice is disfigured by the punishment of offenders so homogeneously and, yet, so disproportionately.”314
C.

Proposed Legislation

Despite the criticisms of the JOA even soon after its enact310
311
312
313
314

Id.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 617.
Id. at 620.
Roe, 542 N.E.2d at 620.
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ment, it remains in effect today. Moreover, New York State courts
remain the only state courts that automatically adjudicate all youthful
offenders in adult criminal court.315 Although taking variant approaches, every other state employs an effective transfer procedure
for even the most violent youths that is used to evaluate whether the
particular youth, the circumstances underlying the offense, and the
nature and severity of the charges imposed, justify adjudication in
criminal court.316 Furthermore, notwithstanding the nature of the offense, New York State treats every sixteen year old juvenile alike,
“adher[ing] to the early twentieth century age limitation” as a magical
number to hold juveniles accountable for their criminal culpability,
subjecting them to the same or similar punishment that would otherwise be imposed upon an adult offender.317
Despite the influential role that political standpoints tend to
have on state legislatures, New York State remains tough on youths,
arresting approximately 50,000 youths between sixteen and seventeen
years old each year.318 Moreover, New York State and North Carolina are the only states that presently recognize age sixteen as the appropriate age to subject a juvenile to the jurisdiction of the criminal
courts.319 However, in light of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions, recognizing the significant differences that exist between
the culpability of adult and juvenile offenders, the New York State
Legislature has proposed new policies that would raise the age of
culpability to seventeen years old, thereby providing either the family
court or a specialized youth court with jurisdiction over certain proceedings for sixteen and seventeen year olds.320
In early January of 2012, two bills concerning the appropriate
age for criminal culpability came before the New York State Senate.321 One bill, better known as the Assembly Leadership Bill, if
passed, would effectively increase the maximum age of family court
jurisdiction over juveniles from fifteen years old to seventeen years
315

Merril Sobie, Raising the Age: New York’s Archaic Age of Criminal Responsibility,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 4, 2012, at 4.
316
Id.
317
Id.
318
N.Y.S.B. 7394 (2012).
319
Sobie, supra note 315; see also The Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy,
Schuyler Center Source, Raise the Juvenile Jurisdictional Age: An Update, available at
http://www.scaany.org/resources/documents/scs_issue12_raisetheage_update_000.pdf.
320
See generally N.Y.S.B. 7394; N.Y.S.B. 7020.
321
The Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy, supra note 319.
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old and simultaneously raise the present age of criminal responsibility recognized under the corresponding Penal Law.322 Additionally,
the bill would repeal the JOA—meaning that thirteen through fifteen
year olds accused of violent crimes would have an automatic right to
a hearing in family court in order for the court to carefully decide
whether to transfer and prosecute the juvenile in criminal court.323
Finally, the bill proposes that the maximum age at which a juvenile
may be considered for youthful offender status be raised from eighteen to nineteen.324
The second bill, the Sentencing Commission Bill, which was
proposed by Chief Judge Lippman, portrays a hybrid approach, specifically accounting for the logistics that will come into play if the
New York State Legislature raises the age of criminal culpability so
as to funnel sixteen and seventeen year old juveniles through the
court system.325 This bill would create “youth parts” within the Supreme Court.326 In effect, these specialized parts, rather than family
courts, would have jurisdiction over cases involving sixteen and seventeen year old offenders.327 Among the benefits behind the establishment of the youth parts is that the judges that would preside in
these courts would have specialized training in psychology, and thus,
would be apt to decide these cases and evaluate appropriate punishment in light of the behavioral and emotional changes that juveniles
undergo in the course of their adolescence.328 The ultimate goal of
this bill is to establish an appropriate forum that balances the existing
family court rehabilitation-focused approach and the culpabilityfocused approach underlying criminal court procedural law.329
Although these bills propose a policy and procedure for juvenile adjudication in harmony with that employed in the vast majority
of states, the potential enactment of the bills has stirred up a controversial debate. For instance, opponents of the bill have argued that
the family court system is already overburdened, and thus, without
adequate judicial resources to carry out the plans intended.330 Specif322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330

Sobie, supra note 315.
Id.
N.Y.S.B. 7020 (2012).
Sobie, supra note 315.
Id.
Id.
N.Y.S.B. 7394 (2012).
Id.; Sobie, supra note 315.
Sobie, supra note 315.
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ically, budgetary concerns are real because the family court system
currently has a $162 million budget,331 which is bound to balloon as a
result of funneling an increased number of youths through its courtrooms.
Notwithstanding the result of these two bills, the roots of the
Family Court Act should not be forgotten. The Family Court Act
revolutionized juvenile adjudication, extending important due process
rights to all juveniles.332 Since the United States Supreme Court’s
acknowledgment that courts may not deprive juveniles of their due
process protection, the family court system further evolved so as to
uphold additional procedural rights and dispose of cases in a manner
that allows for rehabilitation—recognizing that children are just children and should not be subjected to the same standard as mature and
developed adults.333
The passage of either of the pending bills would serve to recognize that “New York’s children, including those that commit
youthful mistakes, are no different than their counterparts in the rest
of the country.”334 All sixteen and seventeen year olds, deserve both
equal protection under the law, and the same or substantially similar
opportunities for rehabilitation, as their younger teenage counterparts.
In support of the family court system in general, and succinctly stated
by Chief Judge Lippman, “[w]e cannot afford to falter. If we miss
opportunities to give children the support they need to grow into productive adults . . . then we will feel the social consequences for decades to come.”335
III.

CONCLUSION

If either bill is enacted in New York State, it is likely that
courts will be less inclined to perform legal gymnastics simply to
clear a teenager’s record, but rather, will defer to the family court’s
findings. Nevertheless, the facts and resolution of Jaquan illustrate
that a fine line exists between providing youths with due process and
rendering proper punishment. In light of the recognition of the “benefits” of a family court disposition over a criminal record, it seems as
331
332
333
334
335

Chief Judge Lippman, Family Court 50 Years Later, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 24, 2012).
See Gault, 387 U.S. at 48.
Lippman, supra note 331.
Sobie, supra note 315.
Lippman, supra note 331.
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though the First Department did young Jaquan a disservice when it
ruled to suppress the gun and reverse the disposition. Jaquan, like
other impressionable, vulnerable, and reckless teenagers, got caught
up as the delivery boy in an illegal business transaction. We can only
guess whether and what personal circumstances might have caused
him to get involved in such a dangerous and destructive undertaking.
However, neither personal circumstances nor Jaquan’s youthful status
should negate the fact that he was caught red-handed with a gun in
his backpack and nearly one-thousand dollars in cash in his pocket.
It is more than plausible that this was not the first time that Jaquan
had engaged in questionable activity, as he was street smart enough
to refuse to give his last name to the police officers or carry any type
of identification.
Yet, notwithstanding his actions and culpability, the family
court gave Jaquan a fifteen-month probation period, directing
Jacquan to perform community service and attend school on a regular
basis during this time. Arguably, a probation officer might have had
the capacity to see that Jaquan stay out of trouble and perhaps be rehabilitated. However, the First Department, in its ruling, absolved
Jaquan of responsibility for carrying a handgun. What lessons did
Jaquan learn from his exposure to the court system? Ultimately,
without any mechanism for deterrence or rehabilitation, Jaquan may
continue along his troubled path, leaving open the possibility that he
will likely find himself back in court at a future date.
The question remains unresolved—at what point does a
youthful indiscretion rise to the level of an intentional criminal act?
Presently, the answer turns mainly upon the age of the actor. As a
society, we are inclined to see the good in people and recognize, like
Chief Judge Lippman, that children especially deserve second chances. Nevertheless, the legislature and courts must strike the balance
between their recognition of the inchoate nature of juveniles and their
responsibility to protect the citizenry.
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